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Abstract 
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1. Introduction 
Game-theoretic analysis of price competition suggests that collusion will arise more easily in 
growing than in declining markets. Tacitly collusive agreements involve that deviations from 
the collusive path trigger retaliations by other firms, such that, from that point on, the 
deviating firm’s profits will be lower than if it had stuck to the agreed behaviour. When the 
demand grows steadily the gains from deviating from the collusive agreement are, at any 
point in time, small in comparison to the future losses from retaliation. Analogously, when the 
demand keeps shrinking these losses will be relatively small compared to the short-term gains 
from deviations. Indeed, when the market is on the verge of collapsing, it will be virtually 
impossible to motivate firms to maintain the collusive agreement. 
This prediction is somewhat at odds with some of the views of the European Commission 
where demand growth is often interpreted to be a factor that makes collusion more difficult. 
This discrepancy can be explained by the fact that the above reasoning assumes a constant 
number of market participants despite market growth, while in markets with growing demand 
the pro-competitive effect of entry may have to be taken into account. Nevertheless, there do 
exist markets with high entry barriers in which the intrinsic impact of demand growth is not 
moderated by entry. In addition, the study of the pure effect of market growth and decline is 
interesting in its own right given economists’ general interest in understanding collusion. 
Here it is important to point out that the game-theoretic rationale presented above seems 
rather intuitive and may, hence, be expected to have some predictive value. However, other 
possibilities are also reasonable a priori and need to be considered. For instance, one can 
argue that in an industry with brilliant future demand conditions firms might not punish 
deviations very severely, since the short-term losses of firms that have been cheated on are 
small in comparison to the possibilities of earning, in one way or another, good profits in the 
future. In contrast, in industries with declining demand firms may have the tendency to stick 
together out of a sense of desparation.  
We believe that the relation between demand growth and collusion is a relevant policy issue. 
In their analysis of the economics of tacit collusion for the European Commission, Ivaldi et al. 
(2003) discuss demand growth as one of the potentially relevant factors for collusion, together 
with, among others, the number of competitors, the symmetry of market shares and market 
transparency. In his comprehensive analysis of competition policy, Motta (2004) also refers to 
the relation between demand evolution and collusion.  
To shed some light on this issue we present an experimental comparison of collusion under 
price competition in duopoly markets with growing and shrinking demand. In designing the 
experiment we took advantage of the possibility yielded by experiments of studying the two 
cases completely in parallel. The evolution of demand in our growing markets is just the 
reverse in time than the one for the shrinking markets. Our design choices also make it 
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possible to completely eliminate issues related to the complexity of identifying what 
(perfectly) collusive behaviour consists in. As a result of these choices we have what we 
believe is a very clean comparison of behaviour under the two conditions.  
Collusion has been one of the subjects of several experimental studies on price competition, 
albeit in a static demand framework. Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) study the effects of 
market concentration in a one-shot price competition framework with constant marginal cost 
and inelastic demand. In equilibrium prices are at the marginal costs and profits are zero, but 
if firms manage to establish collusion substantial profits are possible. In their experiments, 
price is above marginal cost for the case of two firms but equal to that cost for three and four 
firms.1 Thus collusion is a relevant phenomenon in duopolies, but for markets with three firms 
or more the competitive equilibrium retains its predictive power. Apesteguía, Dufwenberg, 
and Selten (2003) study theoretically and experimentally how leniency programs in anti-trust 
influence pricing as well as the formation and detection of cartels in a simple Bertrand 
competition environment. The experimental results show that leniency conditions which grant 
whistle-blowers immunity from fines lead to lower prices than the standard anti-cartel 
conditions under which all firms in a detected cartel will be punished. 
Selten and Apesteguía (2002) experimentally study price competition in a model of spatial 
competition. The authors can identify collusive behaviour in individual markets, and average 
prices slightly above those chosen in equilibrium. Abbink and Brandts (2003) examine an 
experimental design in which price competition can lead to positive equilibrium price-cost 
margins. Their design is based on the theoretical model by Dastidar (1995) in which there are 
multiple equilibria in pure strategies. Firms operate under decreasing returns to scale and have 
to serve the whole market. In the experimental results the collusive outcome is, though not an 
equilibrium, one of the most frequently observed. The result that average prices tend to 
decrease with the number of firms is mainly due to less collusion in larger oligopolies. 
Numerous studies report results on related issues from quantity competition environments. 
Huck, Normann and Oechssler (1999, 2004) provide results and a recent survey of work on 
collusion and competition under repeated quantity competition. Their conclusion is that 
duopolists sometimes manage to collude, but that in markets with more than three firms 
collusion is difficult. With exactly three firms, Offerman, Potters, and Sonnemans (2002) 
observe that market outcomes depend on the information environment: Firms collude when 
they are provided with information on individual quantities, but not individual profits. In 
many instances, however, total average output even exceeds the Nash prediction.  
Holt (1995) discusses some experimental research on so-called plus factors for collusion, but 
does not refer to any work with demand changing over time. The closest work to ours is by 
Davis, Harrison and Williams (1993), who compare behaviour in posted price and double 
                                                          
1 With duopolies, Dufwenberg, Gneezy, Goeree, and Nagel (2002) find that the introduction of price floors (the 
minimum feasible price is above marginal costs) lead to lower average prices compared to the standard Bertrand 
game. Thus, collusion is weakened when price floors are introduced. 
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auction settings with a demand that first grows and then shrinks. The demand is played by 
human subjects and, in the tradition of the older market experiment literature, participants 
only know their own parameter values. This means that sellers are not informed about 
demand shifts. In the analysis observed prices are compared to the Walrasian one. It turns out 
that double auction prices tend to be close to the Walrasian one. In contrast, the posted offer 
prices tend to start, when the demand grows, below the Walrasian price and drift slowly 
upward; when the demand then declines prices exhibit some inertia and remain high with 
respect to the Walrasian. 
Our work is different in several ways. First, we will have complete information about market 
conditions, including the time-evolution of demand. This is the case the game-theoretic 
analysis directly pertains to and it is also the natural one in many instances. Second, we will 
study the case of demand growth and the one of demand decline in separate treatments. 
Therefore, we will not have to deal with any possible sequence effects, which are not relevant 
in our context. Third, we are interested in the case of an indefinite temporal relation between 
firms and not in the case of a fixed and known number of market rounds. In the design section 
we will explain how we implemented such an environment. Finally, our demand and cost 
conditions are extremely simple so as to be able to focus on the issue at hand.2 
Our results show that, contrary to the game-theoretic intuition, collusion is significantly 
higher in shrinking than in growing markets. Moreover, it is for all the rounds of the 
experiment that average market prices for the shrinking demand case are above those for the 
growing demand case. Overall, prices are more than twice as high under shrinking demand 
conditions. We conjecture that the prospect of rapidly decreasing profits exerts a disciplining 
effect on decision makers in the shrinking demand environment. High profits need to be made 
quickly. In growing markets, on the other hand, co-operation becomes more essential in the 
future, such that it seems little harmful to experiment with different strategies early on. This 
may be illusionary, however, as erratic and competitive pricing might be interpreted as 
aggressive and destroy trust between the firms. This makes it then very difficult to establish 
trust and co-operation later when it really matters. 
Though our experiment was designed with antitrust applications in mind, our results are 
relevant to a broader range of issues. Competition and co-operation are vital issues in the huge 
literature on public good and dilemma games.3 Like in our framework, the stage game 
equilibrium and the pareto-efficient co-operative outcome are at the opposite ends of the 
strategy space (an important difference, though, is that there is no dominant strategy in our 
price competition environment). We might expect that outcomes in public good games are 
also sensitive to dynamics in the stakes. 
                                                          
2 For other experimental work with dynamic market features see the work of Isaac and Reynolds (1992a and 
1992b) on R&D competition. 
3 See Ledyard (1995) and Camerer (2003) for surveys of public goods experiments.  
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2. Design and Procedures 
The background model for both our treatments in duopolistic price competition is a 
homogenenous good market with exogenously given demand and no costs. In each round the 
demand is willing to buy any amount of the good at a constant price up to a certain maximum 
quantity. This kind of “box” demand schedule has previously been used for the study of 
double auctions by Smith (1982), Holt, Langan and Villamil (1986), and more recently by 
Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) for the study of Bertrand competition. Figure 1 illustrates the 
demand schedule we used. The diagram depicts the case of a growing market. The demand’s 
willingness-to-pay is normalised to 1. The variables qt, etc. are the quantities demanded in 
period t. 
Figure 1: The Demand Schedule 
2.1. The model and the experimental environment 
In our design firms compete by simultaneously posting a price. The firm that has posted the 
lower price serves the entire market and realises a profit of its price times the market demand. 
If both firms set the same price, then it is assumed that each of the firms serves exactly half of 
the demand.4 The strategic analysis of the stage game is straightforward and leads to the well-
known Bertrand paradox (Bertrand (1883)). Whatever the price set by the competitor, each 
firm’s best response is to slightly undercut that price. It follows that if there is no smallest 
money unit, there can be no equilibrium with a positive price, and the unique equilibrium is 
one in which both firms set a price of zero and hence make zero profit. If a smallest money 
                                                          
4 Alternatively, a random draw could decide which firm sells the good. This does not alter any of the theoretical 
arguments. 
p
qq3q2q1
1
0
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unit exists (as it typically does in both real life and experimental environments), then another 
equilibrium exists in which both firms set their price equal to the smallest money unit.  
In the context of an infinitely repeated game the equilibrium analysis leaves us with an 
embarrassment of riches. If players value future payoffs sufficiently high, then virtually every 
distribution of profits is supported by an equilibrium of the repeated game. In this framework 
collusion is no longer incompatible with rational play. Firms could, for example, agree to first 
set always the maximum price, but punish deviations with playing the competitive 
equilibrium ever after. It is easy to see that such an agreement is self-enforcing. The short-
term gain from undercutting the competitor once is far outweighed by the loss from being 
stuck in the unprofitable equilibrium forever after the cheat.  
This is just one example of a retaliation strategy that triggers a collusive equilibrium. 
Countless others exist, many may involve less harsh retaliation. Notice that the collusive 
“agreements” we are talking about are only figurative. When collusion is illegal and explicit 
agreements subject to prosecution, such agreements need to be tacit. The question then arises 
as to which factors of the economic environment facilitate the emergence of collusive 
behaviour without explicit negotiation. A market that is characterised by strong growth, as 
depicted in figure 1, looks much more susceptible to the emergence of tacit agreements than a 
market in which demand is contracting. The reason is that in a growing market future payoffs, 
as compared to the current payoff, are higher than in a shrinking market. Thus, the gains from 
undercutting the competitor now are relatively low compared with the foregone profit that 
future co-operation would yield. This increases the incentives to sustain collusion, making it 
more likely to emerge. The experimental environment we create here allows us to put this 
conjecture to a test.   
This environment was presented to participants in a very stylised manner. In each round there 
was a “prize” which, depending on the treatment, either grew or shrank over time. Subjects 
knew from the start the way in which the prize would change over time. In each round the two 
players in a match had to separately choose a percentage consisting in an integer between 0 
and 100 inclusive; matches were held constant throughout the experiment. If both players 
chose the same percentage then each player obtained half the prize multiplied by the 
(common) percentage. If the chosen percentages were not the same then the player who had 
chosen the lower percentage obtained the prize multiplied by that percentage, while the player 
who had chosen the higher percentage obtained nothing. Each round took place in exactly the 
same way, with a new different prize per round. This way of presenting the situation to 
participants is simple and facilitates focusing on the evolution of demand. Note that it reflects 
both the case where the demanded quantity changes over time and the one where the 
(constant) reservation price changes. In the latter case, which is strategically equivalent, the 
quantity would be normalised to 1 and the demand’s willingness-to-pay would grow or 
shrink. We could have implemented this by asking subjects for the absolute payoff they 
demand, where we would have allowed a growing or shrinking upper bound. However, we 
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preferred the framing we used because the competitive and the collusive strategies do not 
change their appearance throughout the experiment. In this study, we do not focus on the 
question whether individuals are able to identify collusive strategies.   
In the instructions (reproduced in appendix A)5 participants were told that the experiment 
consisted of a number of rounds, but it was not specified how many.6 At the time of 
recruitment subjects had been told that the experiment would last for about two hours so that 
they probably expected a good number of rounds. In both treatments we ended the experiment 
after 27 rounds. In this way the data from both treatments were obtained in the same ex-ante 
and ex-post length conditions. In the case of increasing demand the growth rate of the prize 
was 25% from round to round. To generate the exact reverse sequence in prizes for the 27 
rounds, in the decreasing demand case prizes shrank at 20% from round to round. We chose 
these high rates to ensure the saliency of the variation in demand.  
Figure 2 
Figure 2 illustrates the development of the market demand (prize), denominated in the 
fictitious experimental currency. It can be seen that the growth rates we have chosen indeed 
lead to a rather extreme range of values. The instructions explained the way in which the prize 
would evolve over time. In addition, at the beginning of each round the prize for the next 
round was highlighted on the computer screen. At the end of each round participants received 
                                                          
5 The Spanish original is available upon request. 
6 The data analysis does not reveal any indication of an end-game effect. Thus we are confident that subjects did 
not anticipate the actual number of rounds. 
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information about the percentage chosen by the other player in the match and about the 
resulting payoffs for both participants. 
The number of rounds was chosen as a trade-off between two conflicting goals. On the one 
hand we aimed at having a large number of rounds to study collusion in a long-term 
relationship between two firms. On the other hand, the exponentially increasing or decreasing 
prizes meant that the difference between low-payoff and high-payoff rounds would quickly 
become very large, so large indeed that low-payoff rounds would be worth less than a cent. 
The choice of twenty-seven rounds balanced these two goals in a reasonable way.  
2.2. The conduct of the experiment 
The experiment was conducted at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB), Spain. The 
experiment was computerised, with software developed using the RatImage programming 
package (Abbink and Sadrieh (1995)).7 Subjects were recruited by posters placed all over the 
university campus. Each subject was allowed to participate in only one session, and no subject 
had participated in experiments similar to the present one. The subjects were undergraduate 
students from a wide range of disciplines, with slightly more women than men. Almost all 
participants were Catalan or Spanish. 
At the beginning of a session the written instructions were read aloud. The instructions used a 
“neutral” language, i.e. we did not refer to “markets” or “prices” and did not explain the 
underlying market model. We chose this wording solely because the rules of the game seemed 
easier to understand this way.   
After all questions were answered, the computer programme started play. At the outset of 
each round, participants were informed about the prize in the current round in talers (the 
fictitious experimental currency). The smallest prize was 89, exponentially increasing to 
(decreasing from, resp.) 29448 talers. Table 1 shows the development of the prize in the two 
treatments. All prizes, percentages and profits were rounded to integers for convenience.  
The same subjects played in the same market throughout the session. To ensure anonymity 
subjects were not told with whom of the other participants they were in the same pair. The 
subjects were seated distantly from one another in order to ensure that they could not 
influence each other’s behaviour. 
The total earnings of a subject from participating in this experiment were equal to the sum of 
all the profits he made during the experiment. A session lasted for about 45 minutes (this 
includes the time spent to read the instructions). At the end of the experiment, subjects were 
paid their total earnings anonymously in cash, at a conversion rate of one euro for 1500 talers. 
Subjects earned between €3.49 and €56.42 with an average of €23.44, which is considerably 
                                                          
7 The software was a modified version of the programme presented in Abbink and Sadrieh (1996). 
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more than students’ regular wage in Barcelona. At the time of the experiment, the exchange 
rate to other major currencies was approximately US-$1.30 and £0.70 for one euro. 
Table 1. Development of the prizes 
Round Prize in talers 
(growing) 
Prize in talers 
(shrinking) 
Prize in € 
(growing) 
Prize in € 
(shrinking) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
89 
111 
139 
174 
217 
272 
340 
424 
530 
663 
829 
1036 
1295 
1619 
2024 
2530 
3162 
3952 
4940 
6176 
7720 
9649 
12062 
15077 
18846 
23558 
29448 
29448 
23558 
18846 
15077 
12062 
9649 
7720 
6176 
4940 
3952 
3162 
2530 
2024 
1619 
1295 
1036 
829 
663 
530 
424 
340 
272 
217 
174 
139 
111 
89 
0.06 
0.07 
0.09 
0.12 
0.14 
0.18 
0.23 
0.28 
0.35 
0.44 
0.55 
0.69 
0.86 
1.08 
1.35 
1.69 
2.11 
2.63 
3.29 
4.12 
5.15 
6.43 
8.04 
10.05 
12.56 
15.71 
19.63 
19.63 
15.71 
12.56 
10.05 
8.04 
6.43 
5.15 
4.12 
3.29 
2.63 
2.11 
1.69 
1.35 
1.08 
0.86 
0.69 
0.55 
0.44 
0.35 
0.28 
0.23 
0.18 
0.14 
0.12 
0.09 
0.07 
0.06 
We conducted one session with each treatment. Subjects interacted with each other within 
pairs but not across pairs so that each pair can be considered as a statistically independent 
observation. We gathered 7 independent observations with growing markets and 9 
independent observations with shrinking markets. The difference in the number of 
observations stems from a different show-up rate in the sessions. 
Our analysis consists of nonparametric tests performed on these data points. Most analyses 
comprise of comparisons across treatments. For these we use Fisher’s two-sample 
randomisation test, applied to test statistics (e.g. average prices) from the independent 
observations.8 In some occasions we also apply tests to statistics within one sample, e.g. to 
identify effects in the treatments separately. In this case, we use the nonparametric binomial 
test.  
                                                          
8 This test can be seen as a non-parametric variant of the t-test, with which differences in the mean of two 
samples can be detected. For a discussion of the power of this test see Moir (1998). 
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Table 2. Asking prices in the treatment with growing markets 
 Market 1 Market 2 Market 3 Market 4 Market 5 Market 6 Market 7 
rd. F1 F2 F1 F2 F1 F2 F1 F2 F1 F2 F1 F2 F1 F2 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
30 
25 
15 
20 
5 
5 
10 
10 
15 
5 
10 
15 
10 
10 
10 
5 
10 
5 
10 
5 
5 
20 
15 
10 
10 
5 
10 
50 
30 
10 
10 
20 
20 
20 
20 
10 
15 
15 
10 
15 
10 
10 
10 
5 
5 
4 
10 
50 
4 
20 
15 
4 
5 
5 
50 
1 
1 
1 
45 
1 
90 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
1 
1 
1 
10 
1 
1 
2 
8 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
5 
1 
4 
90 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
1 
1 
10 
10 
10 
2 
8 
8 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
40 
19 
25 
15 
20 
20 
30 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
55 
60 
65 
70 
75 
80 
85 
90 
95 
99 
100 
99 
100 
99 
100 
20 
30 
10 
15 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
55 
60 
65 
70 
75 
80 
85 
90 
95 
100 
100 
100 
99 
99 
99 
30 
15 
20 
45 
40 
5 
25 
50 
11 
5 
50 
15 
5 
15 
25 
10 
30 
15 
40 
45 
19 
35 
12 
20 
35 
35 
29 
50 
35 
75 
20 
15 
20 
1 
10 
15 
12 
6 
7 
8 
100 
50 
100 
45 
30 
90 
35 
70 
18 
17 
9 
10 
9 
19 
50 
30 
25 
5 
10 
30 
45 
30 
25 
50 
50 
50 
50 
40 
40 
35 
40 
50 
45 
45 
50 
50 
45 
45 
30 
50 
45 
80 
50 
20 
20 
50 
50 
30 
50 
70 
40 
50 
50 
60 
60 
60 
50 
50 
50 
50 
30 
40 
50 
50 
45 
50 
50 
50 
78 
11 
30 
10 
1 
13 
6 
2 
1 
4 
3 
1 
0 
3 
41 
29 
60 
100 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
45 
35 
25 
15 
12 
1 
5 
3 
1 
5 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
15 
20 
30 
30 
15 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
100 
100 
29 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
10 
20 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
Note: “F1” and “F2” stand for Firm 1 and Firm 2, respectively 
3. Results 
Tables 2 and 3 show the raw data of our experiment. These consist of an asking price for each 
subject and each of the 27 rounds of the experiment. Two adjacent columns, separated from 
the others by a vertical line, represent two players that were matched to the same market. The 
ordering of the markets as “market 1” through “market 9” is arbitrary, as well as the labelling  
of the firms as “firm 1” and “firm 2”. In our symmetric set-up the two firms play exactly the 
same role. 
In this study we focus on the incidence of collusion. A natural measure of collusion is the 
degree to which the firms in a market are able to sustain high market prices. Thus we look at 
this measure first to identify which of the treatments leads to more collusion. Later, we will 
also look explicitly at the occurrence of perfect collusion, i.e. the co-ordinated posting of an 
asking price of 100.  
 10
Table 3. Asking prices in the treatment with shrinking markets 
 Market 1 Market 2 Market 3 Market 4 Market 5 Market 6 Market 7 Market 8 Market 9 
rd. F1 F2 F1 F2 F1 F2 F1 F2 F1 F2 F1 F2 F1 F2 F1 F2 F1 F2 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
30 
45 
20 
40 
45 
50 
60 
58 
70 
40 
50 
30 
60 
70 
75 
65 
70 
65 
65 
80 
90 
80 
90 
100 
100 
100 
90 
75 
20 
40 
60 
70 
50 
60 
70 
60 
65 
70 
60 
75 
75 
70 
70 
70 
70 
80 
80 
80 
90 
90 
100 
100 
100 
100 
80 
40 
40 
40 
50 
40 
50 
60 
80 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
50 
50 
40 
40 
40 
50 
50 
80 
80 
80 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
25 
50 
75 
50 
50 
40 
20 
15 
50 
55 
50 
48 
39 
34 
25 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
25 
80 
50 
50 
70 
45 
39 
70 
70 
64 
55 
60 
50 
47 
25 
23 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
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Note: “F1” and “F2” stand for Firm 1 and Firm 2, respectively 
3.1. Market prices and the occurrence of collusion 
The two treatments of our experiment allow us to study the effect of the market development 
on collusive behaviour. In particular, we can analyse whether market prices in growing 
markets are, as game-theoretic reasoning would suggest, higher than in shrinking markets. 
Table 4 indicates that, on average, this is not the case. The table shows average market prices, 
i.e. the lower of chosen percentages, for the different groups over the 27 rounds of the 
experiment. In all following tables, the ordering of observations is as in tables 2 and 3. 
Indeed, the average market price is more than twice as high in shrinking as in growing 
markets. Fisher’s two-sample randomisation test rejects the null hypothesis of equal average 
prices at a one sided p-value of p=0.018.  
This result appears counterintuitive, as it is the opposite of what the theoretical argument 
would lead us to expect. It seems that the prospect of great future profits in growing markets 
does not encourage collusion; on the contrary, high prices are much more common in 
shrinking markets, where we would expect greater incentives to realise a short-term gain by 
deviating from a collusive agreement. It seems that it is not the promise of growing profit 
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opportunities, but rather the pressure from rapidly declining profits that exerts a disciplining 
effect on firms. If the prize shrinks at a dramatic rate, high profits need to be made early.   
Table 4. Average market prices 
No. growing markets shrinking markets 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
8.96 
1.30 
59.04 
15.41 
37.22 
6.85 
91.07 
62.52 
82.22 
63.30 
10.78 
74.00 
89.30 
56.67 
75.52 
68.15 
Average 31.41 64.72 
The reverse effect holds for growing markets. Since prizes are relatively small in early 
rounds, firms feel less pressure to co-ordinate quickly and can experiment with different 
strategies. We conjecture that these early deviations from collusion make it difficult to 
establish co-operation in later rounds, when prizes become very substantial. As a result, firms 
in these markets fail to co-operate and realise low prices over the entire experiment. 
3.2. Evolution of market prices over time 
We now turn our attention to the dynamic aspects of behaviour in our setting. Figure 3 shows 
the evolution of average prices, for each round averaged over all markets within a treatment. 
In both treatments the figure suggests rising prices over time, with this effect being much 
stronger in shrinking than in growing markets. Further, over the entire duration of play 
average prices are higher under shrinking than under growing demand conditions. The 
difference is relatively small in early rounds, but the gap widens with time.  
To test for trends statistically, we use the following method. We compute, for each session 
separately, non-parametric Pearson correlation coefficients between the market price and the 
round number. Using these as summary statistics, we apply the binomial test to detect a 
systematic tendency to rising or falling prices. The binomial test rejects the null hypothesis at 
a one-sided 5% level if at least 6 out of 7 observations for growing markets and 8 out of 9 
observations with shrinking markets point in the same direction. Table 5 shows the outcome 
of this analysis. The null hypothesis of no trend can be rejected in favour of the alternative 
hypothesis of increasing prices for shrinking markets, but not for growing markets. 
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Figure 3 
Table 5. Pearson correlation coefficients for market prices over time  
No. growing markets shrinking markets 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
–0.53 
–0.19 
+0.98 
+0.10 
+0.51 
–0.39 
+0.55 
+0.91 
+0.84 
+0.80 
–0.21 
+0.58 
+0.41 
+0.66 
+0.82 
+0.86 
Average +0.15 +0.63 
Visual examination of figure 3 and the distribution of Pearson correlation coefficients suggest 
that the upward trend in prices is much more pronounced in shrinking markets. We test this 
conjecture by checking whether the Pearson correlation coefficients listed in table 5 are 
significantly greater in the treatment with shrinking markets. If this is so, then we interpret 
this as evidence for a stronger tendency towards increasing prices in the shrinking market 
condition. Again using the coefficients as summary statistics, we apply Fisher’s two sample 
randomisation test to check for significance. Indeed, the test rejects the null hypothesis of 
equal coefficients with a one-sided p-value of p=0.028. 
Average market price
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This result is consistent with the explanation we propose for the treatment difference in 
prices. Initial behaviour is relatively similar in both treatments. In fact, Fisher’s two-sample 
randomisation test applied to the market prices in the first round does not reject the null 
hypothesis of equal prices (one sided p=0.132). Thus, the difference between the two 
treatments is not due to initial conditions, but to faster co-ordination in shrinking markets. 
This supports our conjecture that the expectation of rapidly diminishing profit opportunities 
disciplines firms to establish collusion quickly. 
3.3. Co-ordination on a common price 
The analysis of co-ordination provides some additional support for the above reasoning. 
Figure 4 shows the number of markets in which both firms submit the same price, over the 27 
rounds of the experiment. Co-ordination on the same price, as typical in collusive agreements, 
is higher in shrinking markets than in growing ones. For most of the 27 rounds of the 
experiment, the frequency of co-ordinated prices in shrinking markets is above the 
corresponding figure for growing markets. The difference is weakly significant at p=0.094 
(one-sided), according to Fisher’s two-sample randomisation test. 
Figure 4 
Both growing and shrinking markets exhibit a tendency towards better co-ordination over 
time. In a manner analogous to our analysis of market price dynamics, we compute Pearson 
correlation coefficients for the co-ordination in the independent markets. In both treatments 
the majority of coefficients is positive. All six observations with growing markets to which 
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this analysis can be applied9 are positive, in the shrinking markets condition this holds for 
seven out of nine observations. The binomial test rejects the null hypothesis that positive and 
negative coefficients are equally likely at a p=0.016 (one-sided) for growing and a weakly 
significant p=0.090 (one-sided) for shrinking markets.  
Table 6. Number of rounds with a market price of 100 
No. growing markets shrinking markets 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
24 
3 
17 
11 
0 
0 
23 
4 
0 
16 
Average 
% of rounds 
1.92 
13.22% 
8.22 
30.44% 
The high degree of co-ordination implies that firms’ individual asking prices and the resulting 
market prices are very similar. Figure 5 shows the evolution of the average asking price, 
which include those demands that have not been the lowest. Naturally the average asking 
prices are higher than the average market prices. Besides that we can observe a picture that is 
very similar to that of the average market prices, as depicted in figure 3. 
3.3. Perfect collusion 
The purest form of collusion is a price set to 100 by both firms, in which case the whole prize 
is shared equally without deduction. Both firms then make a profit of half of the prize. This is 
the only way to collude in which firms extract the entire surplus from the market.10 We rarely 
observe this type of collusion in growing markets. In only one of the seven markets firms 
established co-ordination on the maximum price. This is the most collusive of our 
experimental markets: Both firms set the maximum demand from round 4 on without any 
deviation. However, this market is an exception in the treatment with growing markets, as 
                                                          
9 In one market no co-ordination was ever achieved, so a Pearson correlation coefficient cannot be computed. 
10 In a repeated setting, other forms of collusion are also possible. For instance, firms could agree to take turns in 
setting the lower price and extracting the surplus. However, the maximum feasible price is 100, thus the firm 
with the lower price needs to submit a price lower than 100 and thereby leave some money on the table. Apart 
from being inefficient, such forms of collusion are also less natural and focal than perfect collusion. So it may 
not be surprising that we do not observe them in the data.  
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table 6 shows. The table lists in how many of the 27 rounds the market price was 100, i.e. 
both firms had set this price. 
Figure 5 
Figure 6 shows the evolution of perfect collusion over the 27 rounds of the experiment. In the 
shrinking markets condition collusion steadily increases after an initial period. Thus, the 
increased co-ordination observed earlier coincides with co-ordination on the maximum price. 
In the growing markets condition perfect collusion is almost constant over time, with one 
market perfectly colluding most of the time and all others virtually never. 
3.5. Average profits 
Naturally in our game, profits are directly linked to the prices set, thus we would expect firms 
to make higher profits in the treatment with shrinking markets. Table 9 shows that overall, 
this is the case. The table lists the average per firm profit in the individual markets, totalled 
over the 27 rounds of the experiment.  
While we do observe higher profits in shrinking markets, the effect is not as pronounced as 
the difference in average prices would suggest. Indeed, Fisher’s two-sample randomisation 
test does not reject the null hypothesis of equal payoffs. The reason is that firms in shrinking 
markets do not benefit from the upward trend of market prices over time in the same way as 
firms in growing markets do. When they achieve the highest degree of co-operation, towards 
the end of the experiment, demand has already decreased so much that the gains from 
collusion do not add as much to the firms’ profits as they would do in earlier rounds. 
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Figure 6 
Table 7. Total profit per firm 
No. growing markets shrinking markets 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
4717 
806 
68394 
11383 
31447 
1861 
73307 
27754 
38267 
28253 
7790 
42128 
54542 
33904 
44540 
18629 
Average 27416 32867 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
We report a simple experiment on collusion in duopolies. We analyse whether collusion is 
more likely to occur in markets with growing or in those with shrinking demand. Game-
theoretic reasoning suggests that, if no entry or exit is possible, growing markets should be 
more prone to collusive behaviour. The intuition behind this argument is that short-term gains 
from deviation from the collusive agreement are small in comparison with long-term losses 
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from retaliation. In a shrinking market, on the other hand, future profits are relatively small, 
such that the short-term gains from deviating are much more attractive.    
In our experiment we observe the exact opposite. Collusion is much more frequent in 
shrinking markets, leading to average prices that are more than twice as high as in growing 
markets. In shrinking markets co-ordination on the maximum price is almost three times as 
frequent as in growing markets. Further, we observe a strong and significant upward trend in 
shrinking markets that is much more pronounced than in growing ones.  
We conjecture that this is due to a strong disciplining effect that is exerted by the prospect of 
shrinking profits. If co-operation is not achieved early, then profit opportunities melt away at 
a fast pace. In growing markets, however, early rounds are worth relatively little, which might 
tempt firms to “play around” and try out different strategies, rather than strive for the 
collusive outcome immediately. This behaviour can then easily be interpreted as aggressive 
by the competitor. This perceived aggressive behaviour may destroy trust between the firms 
in early rounds. Without trust co-operation is not possible. As a consequence, when the prize 
becomes precious in the later rounds of the experiment, collusion is difficult to establish. 
The policy implications of our results are straightforward. Antitrust authorities should be 
advised to be particularly vigilant towards markets that are shrinking or stagnating. As our 
experimental results show, firms find it easier to establish collusive co-operation in those 
markets than in markets that are especially dynamic in their development. Our experiment 
exhibits a pure behavioural effect, but in real life other factors might even reinforce these 
tendencies. Shrinking markets are often long-established markets for product families that 
have passed the peak of the product cycle. Thus, firms know each other typically quite well 
and can anticipate each other’s behaviour better than competitors in growing markets that are 
newly emerging. 
Of course, our experiment is not the last word in the matter. To focus on the behavioural 
effect we were examining, we used an extremely simplified market model, abstracting from 
much of the richness of real-life oligopolies. In our experiment firms sold a homogeneous 
good without product differentiation. Further, we abstracted from the effect that different 
costs structures might have on collusion. We also did not address the effect of possible entry 
and exit, taking the number of firms as exogenously given. In order to obtain a complete 
picture of collusion in dynamic markets, more research is needed that takes these issues into 
account. Nevertheless, we believe that our counterintuitive results are a good starting point for 
a comprehensive analysis.  
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Appendix A. Instructions 
 
General information  
We thank you for coming to the experiment. The purpose of this session is to study how people make 
decisions in a particular situation. During the session it is not permitted to talk or communicate with 
the other participants. If you have a question, please raise your hand and one of us will come to your 
desk to answer it. During the session you will earn money. At the end of the session a show-up fee of 
3 euros plus the amount you will have earned during the experiment will be paid to you in cash. 
Payments are confidential, we will not inform any of the other participants of the amount you have 
earned. In the following, all amounts of money are denominated in talers, the experimental currency 
unit. 
During the experiment you will be paired with another participant. You will be paired with the same 
participant throughout the experiment. You will not be informed of the identity of the person you are 
paired with. 
The experiment consists of a number of separate rounds.  
Prize per round 
In each round there will be a “prize”. This prize will increase (decrease) from round to round.  The 
prize in round 1 will be 89 (29448) talers and increase (decrease) at a constant rate of 25% (20%). The 
prize in round 2 will be (111) 23558, in round 3 (139) 18846…At the beginning of each round you 
will be informed of what exactly the prize of the round is. 
Decisions  
In each round you and the other participant that you are matched to will each separately make a 
decision. This decision will consist in choosing a percentage between 0 and 100. When you have 
decided on the percentage please enter it into the computer. 
Earnings  
After each round, the earnings for each pair will be determined as follows. If the two percentages of 
the two participants in a pair are the same then each participant obtains half the prize of the round 
multiplied by the percentage. If the two percentages are not the same then the participant who chose 
the lowest percentage obtains the percentage multiplied by the prize of the round and the participant 
that chose the higher percentage obtains nothing in that round. 
Information about Earnings 
After each round, your round earnings are credited to your talers account. At any moment during the 
experiment you will be able to check your talers account on the screen. 
At the end of the experiment your total earnings in talers will be converted into Euros at the exchange 
rate of €1 for every 1500 talers. 
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Appendix B. Prices in the individual markets 
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